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The Thirteenth Amendment and Private
Affirmative Action
Two affirmative action cases in the last two years' have dominated
legal and public debate on a matter of profound social concern, but
an important constitutional issue has not been squarely addressed:
does Congress have power under the Thirteenth Amendment 2 to pro-
scribe private affirmative action programs?3 Even though the Supreme
1. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2730 (1979) (Title VII of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not forbid all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative
action plans); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (Powell, J.,
announcing judgment of the Court) (public schools may not maintain benign racial ad-
missions quotas).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Id. § 2: "Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
3. A determination that Congress is unable to proscribe private affirmative action under
the Thirteenth Amendment is particularly important because Congress's ability to do so
under other constitutional provisions is extremely problematic. In The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court held that Congress's power to forbid discrimination under
the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach action by private persons. Id. at 11-15. Al-
though six justices adopted the contrary position in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966), their statements were dicta since an allegation of state action was made that was
sufficient to prevent dismissal of the indictment at issue. Id. at 754-57. More recently,
reservations about the reach of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment
caused the Court to sidestep the issue in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 107 (1971)
(federal law providing relief from racially motivated torts reaches purely private action);
see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 100-01 (1971) (Griffin Court
avoided Fourteenth Amendment issue by relying on Thirteenth Amendment); cf. Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1964) (Court skirted Four-
teenth Amendment issue by finding that commerce clause supports legislation outlawing
discrimination in public accommodations).
Congress also has power to reach private discrimination through the commerce clause,
but only to the extent that such discrimination affects "'commerce which concerns more
States than one' and has a real and substantial relation to the national interest." Id. at
255. Not all private racial discrimination obstructs interstate commerce. See Note,
Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement
Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUm. L. REv. 449, 465 (1974) (com-
merce power probably does not reach racial discrimination by private schools). Policies
favoring blacks, in fact, may have a positive effect on the national economy. See Kaplan,
Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special
Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 363, 366 (1966) (making blacks economically equal to whites
would sharply increase gross national product and ease drain on economy caused by
welfare expenditures and crime). Congress, therefore, may altogether lack power under
the commerce clause to ban private affirmative action. Such power to forbid affirmative
action as Congress does have, moreover, may not reach purely local businesses. Cf. H.R.
RE'. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 108 (1963) (separate views of Reps. Poff and Cramer)
(Title VII is limited to employers with 25 or more employees because statute is grounded
on commerce clause).
399
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89, 399, 1979
Court recently ruled in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber4
that Title VII,5 based on the commerce clause," does not forbid all
affirmative action in private employment, a potential obstacle to
"benign" discrimination in the private sector remains in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, s which rests on the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement
power.9
The Thirteenth Amendment, after nearly a century of virtual
desuetude, has been reinvigorated in the last decade.10 In Jones v.
4. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
6. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, para. 3. The statute is limited in coverage to employers and
labor organizations "engaged in an industry affecting" interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b), (d), (g) (1976).
7. If construed literally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976) would forbid affirmative action
in private employment. It provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The Court decided, however, that interpreting the statute to forbid all affirmative action
programs would violate the congressional purpose to eliminate vestiges of invidious racial
discrimination. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2727-28 (1979).
The Court carefully avoided "defin[ing] in detail the line of demarcation between
permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans." Id. at 2730. The Court stressed,
however, that the defendant's plan erected no absolute bar to the advancement of white
employees, and that the plan was a temporary measure, intended not "to maintain racial
imbalance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance". Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). The statute states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.
9. The present codification of § 1981 is derived from Revised Statutes § 1977 (1874),
which codified the Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144. The 1870 Act, in turn,
was derived from § I of the Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. Although the
1866 Act rested solely on the Thirteenth Amendment, the 1870 Act was passed pursuant
to the Fourteenth. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431,
439-40 n.11 (1973); Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justifica-
tion for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 1024, 1036-39 (1972) (tracing recodifica-
tions of § 1981). Section 1981 reaches private conduct by virtue of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, however, not the Fourteenth Amendment. See note 21 infra.
10. For some time after ratification, the Thirteenth Amendment was construed to give
Congress wide latitude in identifying and abolishing badges and incidents of slavery. See,
e.g., In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) (Congress may prohibit
discriminatory indenture laws); United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866)
(No. 16,151) (Congress has power to ensure blacks same privilege to testify as is enjoyed
by whites). The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), however, signaled a shift. Sections
400
Thirteenth Amendment
Alfred H. Mayer Co.," the Supreme Court held that the amendment
authorizes Congress to forbid private discrimination against blacks.' 2
The Court's expansive interpretation of both the Thirteenth Amend-
ment 3 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,14 the source of section 1981,15
seemed to promise blacks greater opportunity in education and em-
ployment.' 6
The promise of Jones was qualified, however, in McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transportation Co.,' 7 which held that the Thirteenth Amend-
I and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in public
places, were invalidated. The Court held that the only incidents of slavery vulnerable
to congressional attack were burdens on fundamental rights such as those enumerated in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, not social rights such as those protected by the challenged
statute.
The Court further narrowed congressional power in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S.
1 (1906), holding that the Thirteenth Amendment does not give the federal government
power to protect private employment contracts against racially motivated interference.
The proscription of slavery, the Court said, refers only to the "entire subjection of one
person to the will of another." Id. at 17. Thus little was left of Congress's authority to
eradicate vestiges of slavery when Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
reached the Court.
11. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
12. Id. at 440-41. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, prohibiting private racial discrimina-
tion in the sale of property, was held to be a valid exercise of Congress's power to identify
and eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery. Id. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1
(1906), to the extent inconsistent with Jones, was expressly overruled. 392 U.S. at 441-43
n.78.
Addressing the constitutional question of whether the statute involved, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1976), was authorized by the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court declared that
Congress has power "rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of
slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation." Id.
at 440. This power, the Court said, had been contemplated by the authors of the amend-
ment. Id. at 439-40.
13. The Act of 1866 was passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement
power and subsequently reenacted under the Fourteenth Amendment. See note 9 supra.
The Court has consistently held, however, that Congress's power to reach purely private
discrimination is conferred by the Thirteenth Amendment. See note 21 infra.
14. Jones concerned 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). Sections 1982 and 1981 both stem from
§ I of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The provisions are, therefore, in Pari materia; both
prohibit purely private discrimination. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-73 (1976).
15. See note 9 supra.
16. The Court said that blacks originally viewed the Thirteenth Amendment as a
"promise of freedom" to "buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever
a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this
much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot keep." Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968). To achieve this equality, blacks must be
granted greater educational and employment opportunities. See Note, The Expanding
Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirmative
Action, 90 HARv. L. REv. 412, 452 (1976) (minorities cannot attain freedoms recognized in
Jones without adequate incomes and training) [hereinafter cited as Expanding Scope of
1981]; Note, The Thirteenth Amendment and Education: An Unfulfilled Promise, 20
S.D. L. Ray. 418, 430 (1975) (denial of education forecloses "'the right to live wherever a
white man can live' ") (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968))
[hereinafter cited as Thirteenth Amendment and Education].
17. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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ment authorizes Congress to protect whites against discriminatory fir-
ing.' 8 The McDonald Court's ruling that section 1981 affords whites
such protection is not above reproach. 19 Assuming, however, that sec-
tion 1981 was intended to forbid discriminatory firing of white em-
ployees, the more important question is whether Congress,20 in passing
the statute, exceeded its authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to
abolish the "badges and incidents" of slavery.
2'
This Note examines the threat that the broad interpretation of sec-
tion 1981 in McDonald poses for private affirmative action. The
legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment is explored to de-
termine the nature and extent of the framers' objective to protect
whites. This history demonstrates that congressional prohibition of
benign discrimination is inconsistent with the framers' intent, which
was to authorize protection of whites only to the extent necessary to
aid blacks. Furthermore, the Note demonstrates that in this instance it
would not be appropriate for courts to disregard the intent of the
framers.
I. McDonald: A Cloud on Affirmative Action
The Supreme Court's decision in McDonald casts doubt on the
validity of private sector affirmative action programs. McDonald
arose when the white plaintiffs were fired for stealing from the de-
fendant company, while a black co-employee involved in the theft was
retained.2 2 The Court construed both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and section 1981 to forbid such discriminatory firing of
18. Id. at 287-88 & n.18.
19. See p. 418 & note 134 infra.
20. Section 1981 was enacted by the Thirty-Ninth Congress, more heavily Republican
than the Thirty-Eighth Congress, which passed the Thirteenth Amendment. About half
of the members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress had not participated in the Thirty-Eighth
Congress. See C. FAIRMAN, HISToRY OF THE SuPREmr COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1160
(1971).
21. Although § 1981 was enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment as well as
the Thirteenth, see note 9 supra, the Court has held that the statute reaches private
conduct by virtue of the Thirteenth Amendment. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287-88 & n.18 (1976). Formerly, the Court had held that, because § I of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had been reenacted under the Fourteenth Amendment, a
showing of state action was necessary to establish a violation. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S.
24, 31-32 (1948).
22. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 276 (1976). The plaintiffs
initially filed a grievance with their union, but secured no relief. They therefore filed a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that the company
and the union had both discriminated against them in violation of Title VII. Agency
proceedings proved equally unavailing, and plaintiffs finally brought suit against the
company and the union under Title VII and § 1981. Id.
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whites. 23 By permitting white plaintiffs to invoke section 1981 even
though they had not been burdened because of any defense of blacks,
the McDonald Court significantly expanded the reach of the statute.24
The discrimination challenged in McDonald was not part of an
affirmative action plan,2 5 so the Court never had to define the full
reach of section 1981 and congressional power under the Thirteenth
Amendment. However, the Court's unqualified ruling that section
1981 protects whites against racial discrimination in employment26 sug-
gests the vulnerability of affirmative action in hiring and promotion.27
Courts have, in fact, seriously entertained section 1981 challenges to
the validity of private, voluntary affirmative action programs.28
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,29 decided last Term,
the Court ruled that Title VII does not bar preferential treatment of
blacks in private employment.30 Weber, however, did not involve any
23. The Court flatly declared that Title VII "prohibits all racial discrimination in
employment." Id. at 283. But see United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721
(1979) (Title VII does not forbid all affirmative action in private employment).
After a searching examination of the history of § 1981, the McDonald Court concluded
that "the Act was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the making or
enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race." 427 U.S. at 295.
24. In all previous cases under § 1981 and its companion § 1982, white plaintiffs had
suffered injuries not on account of their race, but because of their support of blacks. See
pp. 418-19 infra (discussing cases). Because the McDonald Court required no showing
that such enmity caused the harm of which the white plaintiffs complained, future courts
could read McDonald to permit whites to bring § 1981 actions any time blacks are treated
preferentially. This Note argues that such a reading of McDonald cannot be supported
under the Thirteenth Amendment.
25. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280-81 n.8 (1976).
26. Id. at 295-96.
27. See Expanding Scope of 1981, supra note 16, at 440-42; Recent Decisions, Civil
Rights: Title VII-42 U.S.C. § 1981-Discrimination in EmPloyment-Applicability to
Vhites, 15 DUQ. L. Rav. 495, 504-06 (1977) (Court's construction of § 1981 hard to square
with imposition of hiring quotas). Cf. Shoenberger, A Prolegomena to Reviving the Civil
Rights Act of 1866: White Standing Under Section 1981-A Federal Common Law Right
to Contract, 8 Loy. CHm. L.J. 81, 107-08 (1976) (§ 1981 may tolerate hiring black over
identically qualified white on basis of race).
28. See, e.g., Krohn v. Harvard Law School, 552 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1977) (dismissing
§ 1983 challenge to private school's admissions policy, but suggesting § 1981 claim might
be sustained); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 450 F. Supp. 496 (D. Conn. 1978) (white's
complaint against summer internship program for minorities stated cause of action under
§ 1981). Cf. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 51, 553 P.2d 1152, 1164,
132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 692 (1976), af'd in Part and rev'd in part, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (relying
in part on McDonald to invalidate preferential public school admissions program for
minority applicants). One commentator reviewing McDonald discussed at length the
possibility of using § 1981 to challenge private affirmative action plans. See Expanding
Scope of 1981, supra note 16, at 440-52.
29. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
30. The Court held that although Title VII would prohibit benign discrimination if
construed literally, the statute must be read against its legislative history. Id. at 2726-27.
The legislative history reveals a congressional purpose to remedy "'the plight of the
Negro in our economy.'" Id. at 2727 (quoting 110 CONG. Rac. 6548 (1964) (remarks of
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section 1981 claim. Moreover, Title VII and section 1981 are not in
pari materia;3' the two statutes occasionally come into procedural and
substantive conflict.3 2 Thus Weber did not defuse the section 1981
threat to affirmative action in private employment.
The expansive view of section 1981 implicit in McDonald jeopar-
dizes benign discrimination not only in employment, but in other
business situations as well. Private contracting with minority businesses
on a preferential basis,33 for example, is arguably illegal under Mc-
Donald. McDonald even threatens affirmative action in private educa-
tion. In Runyon v. McCrary,3 4 decided the same day as McDonald, the
Court held that a private school's agreement to admit a student con-
Sen. Humphrey)). An interpretation of Title VII that forbade all affirmative action
would "'bring about an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute' and
must be rejected." Id.
31. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted nearly one hundred years
after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which § 1981 is derived. While Title
VII expressly prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), § 1981 forbids only discrimination based on race.
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966). Title VII does not cover employers with fewer
than 15 employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976); § 1981 contains no such limitation.
Moreover, Title VII requires employees to pursue their grievances initially through a
complex administrative procedure. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). Employees can pursue
§ 1981 claims in court without delay. While relief under Title VII is limited to two
years' back pay and "such affirmative action as may be appropriate," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1976), plaintiffs may secure equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and
punitive damages, under § 1981, see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,
458-60 (1975).
32. See, e.g., Brown v. General Servs. Administration, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (Title VII
provides exclusive remedy for employment discrimination in federal government, pre-
empting § 1981); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (filing of racial
discrimination charge with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII
does not toll statute of limitations with respect to § 1981 claim). The standards of proof
of discrimination vary between the two statutes. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII claimant need only show disproportionate impact on minorities)
with Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1222-23 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct.
579 (1978) (§ 1981 plaintiff must show discriminatory intent) and Harkless v. Sweeny Ind.
School Dist., 554 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 US. 966 (1977) (same). But see
Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), dismissed as moot, 99 S.
Ct. 1379 (1979) (disproportionate impact standard applied in § 1981 case). Finally, seniority
plans that are valid under Title VII are not necessarily immune from attack under § 1981.
Compare Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (§ 703(h) of Title VII
meant to protect bona fide seniority programs) with DeGraffenreid v. General Motors
Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff stated cause of action under § 1981,
although not Title VII).
33. See Brower : Little, White Help for Black Business, 48 HARv. Bus. REv. 4, 5 (May-
June 1970) (growing number of large firms are making special effort to buy products
from black businesses). Currently, challenges are arising to § 103(f)(2) of the Public Works
Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1977 Supp.), which mandates that 10%
of all federal grants for local public works be channelled to minority business enterprises.
See, e.g., Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2403
(1979) (upholding the Act); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 459
F. Supp. 766 (C.D. Cal. 1978), appeal filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3623 (U.S. March 9, 1979) (No. 78-
1382) (Act violates Fourteenth Amendment).
34. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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stituted a contract subject to the strictures of section 198 1.35 By apply-
ing section 1981 protection to whites, McDonald could permit whites
to challenge successfully benign racial quotas in private school ad-
missions.
3 6
While the legitimacy of private affirmative action programs under
section 1981 has yet to be decided, lurking in the background is a more
important constitutional question: does the Thirteenth Amendment
authorize Congress to protect whites from benign discrimination at
all? The Supreme Court intimated an affirmative answer in McDonald,
stating that "Congress is authorized under the Enforcement Clause of
the Thirteenth Amendment to legislate in regard to 'every race and
individual.' 37 But the amendment's legislative history suggests that
Congress, in exercising its power to erase the badges and incidents of
slavery, can legitimately protect whites only against discrimination
arising from hostility toward blacks.
II. The Thirteenth Amendment's Original Purpose
Congressional debates over the Thirteenth Amendment contain gen-
eral discussion of ensuring white citizens the privileges and immunities
of the several states and equal protection of the law.38 These broad
expressions of concern may suggest condemnation of discrimination
against whites in favor of blacks. A careful reading of the debates, how-
ever, discloses that protection of whites was narrowly associated in the
framers' minds with achieving meaningful emancipation.
A. The General Purpose to Eradicate the "Badges and
Incidents" of Slavery
The first clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing slavery
and involuntary servitude, protects whites and blacks alike.39 The
35. The complainants were black parents who had unsuccessfully attempted to enroll
their students in a private school. The school had advertised to the general public. Id.
at 172.
36. McDonald's potential adverse effect on affirmative action in education may be
mitigated by Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), in which the
Court narrowly upheld the use of race-conscious admission policies. Id. at 320 (Powell, J.,
announcing judgment of the Court).
37. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 288 n.18 (1976).
38. See generally Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, serialized throughout 12-13 Hous. L. Rav. (1974-75) (Thirteenth
Amendment designed to protect rights of every individual); tenBroek, Thirteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Abolition and Key to
the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. R-v. 171 (1951) (Thirteenth Amendment in-
tended to protect whites in wide range of natural and constitutional rights).
39. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944) (Thirteenth Amendment protects
whites from peonage); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (same).
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amendment's enabling or enforcement clause then gives Congress
power to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery.40 It is for Con-
gress to determine what specific badges and incidents of slavery may
exist.41 The amendment's framers, however, used the phrase "badges
and incidents of slavery" generically to mean manifestations of racial
hostility towards blacks.
Both friends and foes of the amendment recognized that manu-
mission alone would not guarantee blacks meaningful freedom.42 Dis-
abilities customarily imposed on the freedmen would continue to pre-
serve essential features of the slave system.43 For instance, slave and
freedman alike were often barred by law or custom from education 4"
and travel,45 and local criminal codes treated blacks more harshly than
whites. 46 Similarly, blacks lacked status in court.47 In Dred Scott v.
40. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-40 (1968) (Congress has power
under Thirteenth Amendment to determine incidents of slavery and to legislate them
out of existence).
41. Id. at 440.
42. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 app. (1864) (remarks of Sen. Howe)
(supporter) (government must also remove bars to education of freed blacks); id. at
1457 (remarks of Sen. Hendricks) (opponent) (northern prejudice will be "hard upon"
freed blacks).
43. See T. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO 'iiE LAw OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA § 387 (New York 1858) (states forbade free blacks to bear arms, required that
guardians contract for them, and limited their intercourse with whites); Bums, The
Black Code: A Brief History of the Origin, Statutory Regulation and Judicial Sanction of
Slavery in Louisiana, 5 Loy. L.J. 15, 24 (1923) (Louisiana law forbade free blacks "to
consider themselves equal to whites"). Compare CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439
(1864) (remarks of Sen. Harlan) (reciting disabilities imposed on slaves) with V. VOEGELI,
FREE BUT Nor EQUAL 170 (1967) (describing disabilities imposed on freedmen by Black
Laws of Indiana). Black Codes proliferated in the South after ratification of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. See p. 408 infra. See generally Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of
1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REv. 272
(1969) (disabilities imposed on freedman were not removed by § 1 of Thirteenth Amend-
ment).
44. Blacks were kept in ignorance in order to preserve their docility. See p. 413
infra. Also, many whites equated the educational elevation of blacks with the degradation
of whites. See K. STAMPp, THE ERA or RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 78 (1965). In some
southern states, therefore, it was a crime to teach blacks to read or write. See United
States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151) (describing laws of
Georgia, Virginia, Alabama, and Louisiana). Other states depended on the pressure of
public opinion, rather than on specific legislation, to prevent the education of blacks.
See R. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM 70-71 (1949).
45. Deep prejudice moved many Northern states to exclude free blacks entirely. See
V. VOEGELI, supra note 43, at 2 (listing exclusion laws of midwestern states). Southerners
feared that blacks freely roaming the countryside would entice slaves to rebel. See K.
STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 215-16 (1956). After the war, southern blacks were
restricted in their movement by oppressive labor contracts that tied them to the land.
See K. STAMPP, supra note 44, at 80.
46. See K. STAMPp, supra note 45, at 210-11 (blacks punished more severely than whites
for same crime); Haws & Namorato, Race, Property Rights, and the Economic Con-
sequences of Reconstruction: A Case Study, 32 VANO. L. Rlv. 305, 316-17 (1979) (blacks
unable to pay criminal fines were hired out to work).
47. In many states, blacks were forbidden to serve as jurors. T. COBB, supra note 43,
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Sandford,48 the Supreme Court ruled that blacks, whether slave or free,
could not sue in federal court.49 Republicans in the Thirty-Eighth
Congress angrily condemned the decision, 50 and Senator James Harlan
cited the deprivation of blacks' status in court as one of slavery's
wicked incidents.51
Fearing the perpetuation or growth of discriminatory laws and
customs, draftsmen of the Thirteenth Amendment sought not only
to emancipate the bondmen through the first clause, but to eradicate
the incidents of slavery-those disabilities or badges of servitude
fastened upon free blacks-through the second.52 Senator Henry Wilson
proclaimed that the amendment would "obliterate the last lingering
vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrading, and bloody
codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was and is, every-
thing connected with it or pertaining to it. . ."53 Opponents of the
amendment also recognized its expansive aim to complete the freedom
of blacks., 4 Representative Holman, a Democrat from Indiana, warned
that the amendment "confers on Congress the power to invade any
State to enforce the freedom of the African in war or peace. What is the
meaning of all that? Is freedom the simple exemption from personal
servitude? No sir; . . . Mere exemption from servitude is a miserable
idea of freedom."55
at cciv. In some states, the courtroom testimony of a single black had to be corroborated
when blacks were the only parties. Id. at 230 n.7. Blacks were excluded from testifying
altogether when any party was white. Id. at 230; see United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas.
785, 787 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151) (construing section of Civil Rights Act of 1866
that finally guaranteed blacks right to testify even when whites were parties); K. STAMP',
suPra note 45, at 222 ("neither slaves nor free Negroes could testify against whites").
48. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
49. The Court held that the black plaintiff, who had been taken as a slave to a free
territory and later returned to Missouri, had not been emancipated upon reaching free
soil, and therefore had no standing to sue. Id. at 452. Moreover, the Court said that even
a free black was not a "citizen of the United States" entitled to maintain a diversity of
jurisdiction suit in federal court. Id. at 404-05.
50. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1369 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Clark); id.,
2d Sess. 138 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Ashley).
51. Id., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864).
52. See, e.g., id. at 1482 (remarks of Sen. Sumner) (statute books must be cleansed of
"all existing supports of slavery"); id., 2d Sess. 523 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Coffroth)
(same).
53. Id., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864).
54. See, e.g., id. at 2988 (remarks of Rep. Edgerton) (charging that Republicans would
not accept peace until blacks had been made equal to whites socially and politically); id.,
2d Sess. 177 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Ward) (same).
55. Id., 1st Sess. 2962 (1864). Other Democrats echoed Representative Holman's fear
that the amendment would trench upon the states' right to regulate their internal affairs.
See, e.g., id. at 2616 (remarks of Rep. Herrick); id. at 2950 (remarks of Rep. Marcy). Even
Senator Henderson, the Missouri Democrat who offered Senate Joint Resolution 16
(which eventually became the Thirteenth Amendment), was wary of a centralization of
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Shortly after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the feared
course of state and local oppression of blacks began.50 The "Black
Codes" essentially reenacted many of the old slave codes, and thereby
"placed the Negro in a kind of twilight zone between slavery and
freedom."' 7 It was largely to defeat these discriminatory laws that the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, under authority of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.5s
B. Discrimination Against Whites as an Incident of Slavery
Congressional debates on the Thirteenth Amendment reveal an in-
tention to give increased constitutional protection to whites. In par-
ticular, supporters wished to safeguard whites who had been reduced
almost to "semicitizens" 59 because of their antislavery views.60 This
persecution was plainly a manifestation of hostility toward blacks, and
thus an incident of slavery.
Of the thirty-eight Senators who supported the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, nine contributed significantly to the debates. 1 All but one of
the nine acknowledged the amendment's purpose to guarantee civil
liberties to whites.0 2 Their statements, however, were narrowly ad-
power inimical to the interests of the states. See id. at 1462; cf. United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2729 (1979) (history of congressional fear of undue
federal regulation bolsters conclusion Title VII not meant to forbid all voluntary affirma-
tive action in private employment).
56. See United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 794 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151)
(upon adoption of Thirteenth Amendment, enactment of discriminatory laws increased).
See generally K. STAMPp, supra note 44, at 80 (describing post-amendment Black Codes);
Haws & Namorato, suPra note 46, at 311-14 (Black Codes of Mississippi).
57. K. STAMPp, supra note 44, at 80; see Willey, The Case for Preferential Admissions,
21 How. L.J. 175, 175 (1978) (Black Codes threatened to restore de facto slavery).
58. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 20, at 1169-1206 (examining congressional debates on
Civil Rights Act of 1866); J. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 341-42 (1964) (Act
of 1866 passed in response to Black Codes of South). The Act was passed by a two-thirds
vote of Congress over President Johnson's veto. Id. at 350.
59. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Wilson).
60. Abolitionists both North and South were robbed of their civil liberties by law and
custom. With the exception of Kentucky, every Southern state passed laws curtailing
freedom to discuss the merits of slavery. R. NYE, supra note 44, at 140. Since these laws
were vague and difficult to enforce, mobs or "vigilance committees" were organized to
block the dissemination of antislavery thought. Id. at 141. Mob violence against aboli-
tionists "reached its climax during the period 1833-1840, receding in the North after 1845
and continuing with undiminished force in the South until the Civil War and after." Id.;
see D. DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 51-66 (1939)
(recounting mobbings of Northern abolitionists and denial of civil rights generally).
61. See C. FAIRMAN, su ra note 20, at 1138-39. Seven were Republicans and the re-
maining two, Reverdy Johnson of Maryland and John Henderson of Missouri, were
Democrats.
62. While Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland did not address the plight of white
abolitionists in the South, he did discuss the amendment's purpose to "elevate" and
enlighten blacks. See pp. 412-13 infra.
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dressed to the plight of whites who had been persecuted for defending
the rights of blacks.
Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, a Radical Republican, spoke
at length of slavery's disregard for the "equal protection" and "privi-
leges and immunities" of white citizens. 63 Antislavery activists North
and South, he complained, were prevented from publicly denouncing
the "peculiar institution."' 4 Abolitionist presses were "padlocked."065
Freedom of religious opinion, to the extent incompatible with slavery,
was suppressed. 6 The right to assemble peaceably and to petition the
government for redress of grievances was similarly suspended. 7 Even
free elections, Wilson maintained, had been trammeled by proponents
of slavery.68
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois also charged that slavery had
been responsible for denying freedom of speech and press to white
citizens.6 Senator Daniel Clark of New Hampshire elaborated. Speak-
63. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1202-03 (1864).
64. Id. Wilson, like other Republicans in Congress, imagined that a sinister cabal of
slaveholders systematically silenced critics and subverted civil liberties in order to main-
tain a Southern aristocracy. See H. WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE
POWER IN AMERICA (1872-77), portions reprinted in THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 15
(K. Stampp ed. 1959).
65. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1202 (1864). Northern abolitionist presses, in
fact, were not merely "padlocked"; they were destroyed, and radical editors were beaten or
killed. Radicals in Congress recalled with especial ire the mobbing and murdering of
Reverend Elijah P. Lovejoy, editor of an antislavery newspaper in Alton, Illinois. See,
e.g., id. at 2990 (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll); id. at 2979 (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth).
Three times the presses of the Alton Observer were destroyed and, defending the presses
the fourth time, Lovejoy was killed. See D. DUMOND, supra note 60, at 55. In the South,
the pressure of public opinion and the intimidating language of state statutes kept the
press free of antislavery taint. See R. NYE, supra note 44, at 125.
66. Senator Wilson pointed to the persecution of Methodists in the South as proof
that "slavery disregards the right to a free exercise of religion." CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864). Since religious leaders were in the vanguard of the anti-
slavery movement, see note 83 infra, denial of religious freedom was prevalent, see R.
NYE, supra note 44, at 150 (Methodist ministers driven from South for opposing slavery).
The Methodist Church was formally opposed to slavery, although chief ecclesiastics
shunned abolitionism. See Mathews, Orange Scott: The Methodist Evangelist as Revolu-
tionary, in THE ANTISLAVERY VANGUARD: NEW ESSAYS ON THE ABOLITIONISTS 71, 82-83 (M.
Duberman ed. 1965).
67. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1202 (1864). Senator McDougall, an erstwhile
opponent of the Thirteenth Amendment, boasted that he had once singlehandedly molli-
fied a group of armed Kentuckians and Tennesseans "who were undertaking to mob a
few young gentlemen from Massachusetts and New Hampshire because they had signed
a petition to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia...." Id. at 1490; see D4 DUMOND,
suPra note 60, at 66 (congressional gag rules restricted right to petition); R.'NYE, supra
note 44, at 32-54 (history of congressional gag rules).
68. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1202 (1864); see id. at 2615 (remarks of Rep.
Morris) (slavery corrupted ballot box); R. NYE, supra note 44, at 147, 151 (supporters of
emancipationist candidates were closely watched and prosecuted).
69. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1313 (1864). Trumbull spoke as "the organ of
the Committee on the Judiciary." Id.
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ing anthropomorphically of slavery's treatment of whites sympathetic
to blacks, he observed that, "She has assaulted them, imprisoned them,
lynched them, expatriated them, murdered them, for no crime, but
because they testified against her."
70
Senator Harlan, enumerating the incidents of slavery, specified sup-
pression of radical speech and press.71 "Slavery cannot exist," he ex-
plained, "where its merits can be freely discussed; hence in the slave
States it becomes a crime to discuss its claims for protection or the
wisdom of its continuance." 72 Senator Hale, in a few brief remarks,
warmly approved Harlan's words.73
Senators Henderson, Howe, and Sumner also alluded to the nation-
wide mistreatment of antislavery individuals. Henderson, a Missouri
Democrat and author of the resolution that eventually became the
Thirteenth Amendment, recognized that slavery would not permit
"doubts of the sacredness of the institution" to be expressed. 74 Senator
Howe resented the way that proslavery forces attempted to "crush
out" antislavery opinion75 "by bluster, by threat, by menace." 76
Finally, Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, a Radical who had been
caned in the Senate chamber for espousing antislavery views, 77 called
slavery "the perpetual spoiler of human Tights and disturber of the
public peace. .... ,,78
Debate was more prolonged in the House, where the proposed
amendment was defeated at the first session.70 Upon reconsideration,
over fifty congressmen volunteered remarks-most of little significance
in interpreting the amendment.8 0 Many supporters, however, echoed
70. Id. at 1369.
71. Id. at 1439. Harlan deemed suppression of radical speech an incident of slavery
because it denied blacks the elemental "right to receive the common sympathies of the
human race." Id.
72. Id. Every slave state made it a felony to say or write anything that might lead to
discontent or rebellion among slaves. See K. STAMPP, supra note 45, at 211.
73. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1443 (1864).
74. Id. at 1460. Henderson was himself a slaveholder. See Hamilton, The Legislative
and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 9 NAT'L B.J. 26, 29 (1951).
75. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 116 app. (1864).
76. Id. at 117 app.
77. See D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 288-311
(1960). Members of the Thirty-Eighth Congress cited the incident as an example of
slavery's toll on abolitionists. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1321 (1864)
(remarks of Sen. Wilson); id. at 2990 (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll).
78. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1481 (1864).
79. The first vote in the House on the Joint Resolution to amend the Constitution,
taken on June 15, 1864, counted 93 for, 65 against, and 23 not voting. Id. at 2995.
80. Most congressmen focused on the expediency of manumitting the slaves, neglecting
to discuss congressional power to enforce the freedom of blacks under the proposed
amendment. Democrats generally warned that manumission would prolong the war and
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the Senate's aim to protect white abolitionists' civil rights.81
Representative James Ashley of Ohio, manager of the amendment in
the House, claimed that slavery muted white critics by "kidnapping,
imprisoning, mobbing, and murdering" them. 2 Moreover, slavery
"silenced every free pulpit within its control. . .. ,,s3 Representative
Scofield bemoaned that slavery:
demanded exemption from ... criticism . . ., and we granted the
immunity.... [W]e submitted to a censorship of the mails, and
authorized the burning of all offensive papers and letters .... [I]t
demanded silence in this House and in the Senate, and we adopted
the "Atherton gag." . . . [I]t demanded silence in the North, and
every city raised its pro-slavery mob to demolish presses and murder
editors and lecturers.8 4
Other representatives followed in condemning slavery's abuse of
abolitionists.85 Representative King, for example, asked colleagues to
reflect on the "spell-bound terror forbidding debate" with which
proslavery forces "sought to surround that subject upon all occasions,
great and small."8 6 Thaddeus Stevens remembered that his own
speeches against slavery had been delivered "amid the pelting and
hooting of mobs .... ,"87 Representative Kasson illustrated how aboli-
tionists were denied access to courts in the South."" And Representative
Smith of Kentucky concluded that the denial of equal privileges to
Northerners in the South "had more to do with the destruction of
slavery than all things else put together."8 9
turn thousands of helpless slaves into public charges, while Republicans opined that
slavery was moribund anyway. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 20, at 1151-52 (congressmen
only wanted to put themselves on record by uttering defiance or expressing accord with
doom of slavery).
81. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 2990 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Ingersoll).
82. Id., 2d Sess. 138 (1865).
83. Id. Clergymen were at the forefront of the campaign against slavery, which had
deep religious roots. See B. WYATT-BROWN, LEWIs TAPPAN AND THE EVANGELICAL WAR
AGAINST SLAVERY 287 (1969) (abolitionist movement was primarily religious in origin,
leadership, and language); V. VOECELI, supra note 43, at 121 (churchmen supplied anti-
slavery crusade with unflagging source of energy).
84. CONC. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1865). For the history of these restrictions
on the right of petition and use of the mails, see R. NYE, supra note 44, at 32-69.
85. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Orth)
(slavery "muzzled" free speech). Many representatives, of course, had voiced similar com-
plaints at the first session. See, e.g., id., ist Sess. 2615 (1864) (remarks of Rep. Morris)
(slavery denied free speech and corrupted ballot box and judges); id. at 2979 (remarks of
Rep. Farnsworth) (recounting scenes of riot against abolitionists).
86. Id., 2d Sess. 198 (1865).
87. Id. at 265.
88. Id. at 193 (agents of Massachusetts sent to try case affecting blacks in South
Carolina were driven from Charleston).
89. Id. at 237.
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Persecution of abolitionists loomed large as an incident of slavery
because it reinforced all other invidious incidents. While suppression
of radical speech was an evil in itself, it also helped to preserve slavery
as an institution and to prevent the elevation of free blacks to the
social status of whites °0 Thus liberty could not be achieved for blacks
until freedom from discrimination had been secured to abolitionist
whites.
C. McDonald: Expanding Congressional Power Contrary to the
Amendment's Remedial Purpose
The legislative history thus shows that the enforcement clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment was intended to protect whites against certain
forms of malign, not benign, discrimination. Further analysis reveals
that the Thirty-Eighth Congress sought the educational and economic
uplift of blacks to the status of whites. Thus, supporters of the amend-
ment not only lacked an express intent to expose private affirmative
action to congressional assault, but embraced a positive, remedial pur-
pose similar to the one underlying contemporary affirmative action
programs.
It would be paradoxical for courts to build into the Thirteenth
Amendment congressional power to hamper the social and economic
progress of the very group the amendment was designed to aid.
01 The
Thirty-Eighth Congress anticipated that passage of the amendment
would result in economic and educational improvement for blacks.
02
In particular, congressmen contemplated that blacks would acquire
education and land.93
Many congressmen expected free schools to proliferate in territories
where slavery had discouraged education. 4 Reverdy Johnson, Demo-
90. See p. 410 supra; D. DUMOND, supra note 60, at 59-60.
91. See Comment, Civil Rights-42 U.S.C. § 1981: Keeping a Compromised Promise of
Equality to Blacks, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 318, 331-32 (1977) (anomalous to use Thirteenth
Amendment, designed to protect blacks, to defeat efforts to elevate blacks).
92. See generally Thirteenth Amendment and Education, supra note 16, at 423-26
(Congress sought elevation of blacks).
93. See pp. 413-14 infra. Land ownership and education were commonly considered
essential to the "good life." See Meier, Negroes in the First and Second Reconstructions
of the South, in BEYOND THE CIVIL WAR SYNTHESIS: POLITICAL ESSAYS OF THE CIVIL WAR
ERA 275, 279 (R. Swierenga ed. 1975) (black leaders stressed pursuit of education and
acquisition of property).
94. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Harlan)
(slavery has prevented schooling of blacks); id. at 1479 (remarks of Sen. Sumner) (ignorance
of blacks an incident of slavery). Senator Howe of Wisconsin was perhaps the most out-
spoken advocate of education for newly liberated blacks. He insisted that "when the
American people command that these persons shall be free, they should command that
they be educated, or at least that there be no laws enacted in any State to prevent their
education." Id. at 118 app.
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cratic Senator from Maryland and a former foe of emancipation,95
observed that slaves were kept in utter ignorance in order to preserve
their docility.96 He rejoiced that the Thirteenth Amendment would
result in the education of blacks. 97 Senator Wilson concurred, ex-
claiming that "when this amendment . . . shall be consummated, ...
the schoolhouse will rise to enlighten the darkened intellect of a race
imbruted by long years of enforced ignorance."9 8 Similar views were
sounded in the House of Representatives. 9 Representative Morris of
New York observed that "[a]n entire race has been deprived of all
social rank, barred our schools, shut out from the gospel, and then
held to be inferior for not rising in spite of their hinderances to an
equality with the Saxons in the enjoyment of each of these privi-
leges." 10 0
A majority of the Thirty-Eighth Congress also hoped that the freed-
men would become economically self-sufficient.' 0 ' Republicans in both
Houses pressed measures to give the freedmen land.102 One month
after passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress created the
Freedman's Bureau to help blacks adjust to liberty by providing them
with medical care, education, and the opportunity to acquire land.10 3
Some Southern plantations were in fact partitioned and distributed to
95. See Thirteenth Amendment and Education, supra note 16, at 426. Senator Johnson
had been victorious counsel in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (blacks
could not maintain suit in federal court). See Hamilton, supra note 74, at 32.
96. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1424 (1864).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1324.
99. See, e.g., id. at 2949 (remarks of Rep. Shannon); id. at 2955 (remarks of Rep.
Kellogg); id., 2d Sess. 141 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Ashley).
100. Id., Ist Sess. 2615 (1864).
101. See K. STAMPP, supra note 44, at 123 (Radicals thought blacks' economic helpless-
ness would allow white landholders to reestablish bondage in another guise); J. McPHER-
SON, supra note 58, at 246-47 (same). Many Radical Republicans favored federal economic
assistance for freedmen. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 2799 (1864) (remarks
of Sen. Sumner). Other Republicans thought federal aid unnecessary. Goaded perhaps by
the Democratic litany that blacks were not fit for freedom, they insisted that the freed-
men could fend for themselves. See, e.g., id. at 2985 (remarks of Rep. Kelley); id., 2d Sess.
199 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Grinnell). Democrats straddled both sides: while urging that
blacks be kept in bondage lest they die of privation, the minority party opposed special
aid to the freedmen on the ground that blacks could take care of themselves. See id. at
987-88 (remarks of Sen. Morrill) (observing the contradiction).
102. See J. MCPHERSON, supra note 58, at 246-59 (history of confiscation and homestead
measures for freedmen introduced in Congress).
103. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1307 (1865) (text of Freedmen's Bureau
Bill). The bill was vetoed by President Johnson and repassed by a two-thirds majority of
Congress in 1866. See J. MCPHERSON, supra note 58, at 409. Although white war refugees
received some aid under the bill, blacks were conceived to be, and were in fact, the
primary beneficiaries. See Elden, "Forty Acres and a Mule," With Interest: The Constitu-
tionality of Black Capitalism, Benign School Quotas, and Other Statutory Racial Classifica.
tions, 47 J. URs. L. 591, 600 (1969-70).
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freedmen..04 Although legislative efforts to achieve land reform ul-
timately failed,105 they did reflect a substantial interest in the social
and economic advancement of blacks.'0 6
Congress thus intended the Thirteenth Amendment to raze, not
erect, barriers to the social and economic progress of blacks. Prohibiting
benign discrimination would run counter to this remedial purpose.
Section 1981, therefore, to the extent it does invalidate private affirma-
tive action, frustrates the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment.
III. Significance of the Framers' Intent
The framers' intent, even when clear, does not automatically control
constitutional decisionmaking. Constitutional provisions are suscepti-
ble to reinterpretation over time as changing circumstances dictate.
07
Because of the static nature of a written constitution and the difficulty
of the amending process,' 08 phrases such as "equal protection" and
"due process" must be redefined periodically to comport with evolving
public values. 09 Indeed, the very vagueness of such constitutional
104. See J. MCPHERSON, subra note 58, at 259 ("Freedmen ... were being settled with
'possessory titles' on thousands of acres in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida."); K.
STAMPP, subra note 44, at 125-26 (40,000 blacks relocated on land in South Carolina and
Georgia sea islands).
105. Lack of financial resources hampered efforts to distribute land to blacks. See
Elden, supra note 103, at 601. Moreover, most parcels of land that had been confiscated
from Southern whites and given to blacks were eventually returned to their former
owners. See Meier, supra note 93, at 284 (politicians had too great a sense of property
rights to permit permanent confiscation of rebels' estates).
106. See J. MCPHERSON, supra note 58, at 247; K. STAMPP, supra note 44, at 134-35.
Congressional drives for land reform were not, however, prompted solely by solicitude for
the economic welfare of blacks. Congress also wanted to "promote democracy in the
South by destroying the economic basis of the 'landed aristocracy'." J. MCPHERSON, supra
note 58, at 247. And, undoubtedly, some northern congressmen wanted to give freedmen
land as an inducement to stay in the South. See V. VOEGELi, supra note 43, at 177.
107. Chief Justice Marshall counseled that we "never forget that it is a constitution
we are expounding," a document "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently,
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819). See generally Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?
27 STAN. L. Rav. 703 (1975) (Court properly expounds national ideals not expressed in
Constitution); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. CHI. L. REv. 661, 686 (1960) (Court, in construing Constitution, acts as "national
conscience" for American people). But see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 249-418 (1977) (Court should not deviate
from framers' intent).
108. See J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 183-84 (1909) (difficulty of
amending process gives courts freedom in constitutional interpretation).
109. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (Court not con-
fined to historic notions of equality); cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion) (Eighth Amendment draws meaning from evolving standards of decency); Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (cruel and unusual punishment clause "is not
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
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provisions may indicate that they were purposely left to gather mean-
ing from common experience. 110
The words of the Thirteenth Amendment, however, are not nearly
as elastic as those of its complement, the Fourteenth Amendment.,"
Nor were they intended to be. While the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment deliberately chose language capable of growth, 1 2 Thir-
teenth Amendment draftsmen, treating the narrow but burning issue
of emancipation, perceived no need for flexible phraseology.113 Still,
inflexible language should not necessarily prevent expansion of the
Thirteenth Amendment's meaning. Whenever the amendment is ex-
panded beyond the literal meaning of the text and the framers' intent,
however, congruence with contemporary social norms is essential; 1 4
by a humane justice"). The Fourteenth Amendment, in particular, has been subject to
changing interpretations. Compare Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873)
(pervading purpose of Fourteenth Amendment is to protect blacks) with Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirement for voters struck down under
Fourteenth Amendment). See generally T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
TERPRETATION 14 (1969) (original understanding must be "leavened" by "considered con-
sensus"); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1972) (contrasting substantive concerns and decisionmaking techniques of Warren and
Burger Courts).
110. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646-47 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between provisions that permit wide play for
individual legal judgment and those that do not); see P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DECiSIONMAKING 114-18 (1975) (examining "two-clause" theories).
111. See Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1294, 1300-01 (1969) ("slavery" and "involuntary servitude" not vague and elastic
terms evidently left to gather meaning from experience). Compare Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873) (words of Thirteenth Amendment "seem hardly to admit of
construction") with Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947) (framers of Fourteenth
Amendment spoke in "majestic generalities").
112. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1955) (framers of Fourteenth Amendment used expansible language so scope of
amendment could adjust to later needs and concerns).
113. Senator Sumner of Massachusetts offered his own abolition amendment, cast in
terms resembling those of the Fourteenth Amendment, as a substitute for Senate Joint
Resolution 16, the proposal that was eventually adopted. Sumner's proposal read: "Every-
where within the limits of the United States, and of each State or Territory thereof, all
persons are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave." CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 521 (1864). Sumner's version was rejected by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, and subsequent attempts to introduce the proposal during debate
on S.J. Res. 16 were opposed. Senator Trumbull, chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, could not understand "why the Senator from Massachusetts should be so
pertinacious about particular words. The words that we have adopted will accomplish
the object." Id. at 1488. Senator Howard of Michigan, another member of the Judiciary
Committee, also preferred S.J. Res. 16, for "no court of justice, no magistrate, no person,
old or young, can misapprehend the meaning and effect of that clear, brief, and com-
prehensive clause." Id. at 1489. In the face of these objections, Sumner withdrew his
proposal. Id.
114. See L. HAND, THE SPIInT or LIBERTY 15-16 (1. Dillard ed. 1952) (law must lag
behind new judicial ideas unbacked by general acceptance); Lupu, Untangling the Strands
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otherwise, reinterpretation of the amendment will merely reflect
judges' personal preferences. 15 Thus, decisions such as Jones that
arguably build upon the sentiments of the Thirty-Eighth Congress are
supportable because they accord fully with the prevailing sense of
justice.116
There is, however, no consensus opposed to affirmative action that
might justify a departure from the original understanding of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Indeed, as indicated by recent Supreme Court
decisions, few subjects generate greater differences of opinion today.
When faced with an early challenge to affirmative action in 1974,
the Supreme Court awkwardly sidestepped the issue.117 And the Court's
two recent brushes with affirmative action in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke 18 and United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber"19 sharply divided the justices.
12 0
Furthermore, powerful sociological arguments can be marshalled for
and against benign discrimination. On the negative side, such dis-
crimination may frustrate efforts to mitigate race consciousness gen-
erally.' 2 ' Racial quotas that exclude whites may stir resentment and
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MicH. L. REv. 981, 1047 (1979) ("consensus is a necessary
component of any theory of constitutional adjudication in support of unenumerated
values"); cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (Court cannot establish norms for society by deviating from
framers' intent).
115. The three basic sources that inform constitutional interpretations are the text,
extrinsic evidence of the framers' intent, and current social norms. See generally P.
BasT, supra note 110, at 139-71. When the text is ambiguous, public values are unsettled,
and the framers' intent is ignored, little is left to guide a judge in deciding except per-
sonal preference.
116. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 189-91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (be-
lieving Jones to be incorrect, but acquiescing because decision reflects mores of society).
117. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (case dismissed as moot); see Pollak,
DeFunis Non Est Disputandum, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 495 (1975) (arguing Court was right
in not deciding case); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 3-4 (criticizing Court's disposition).
118. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
119. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
120. Each judgment was reached by a bare majority of the Court. In Bakke, four
Justices, Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun, approved a public school's racial ad-
missions quota, 438 U.S. at 324-79, while four other Justices, Burger, Rehnquist, Stevens,
and Stewart, found the quota statutorily impermissible, 438 U.S. at 408-21. Justice Powell
concluded that the school could not constitutionally establish strict racial quotas, but
could make race a factor in admissions decisions. 438 U.S. at 320. In Weber, Justice
Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, JJ., joined. 99 S. Ct. at 2724-30. Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger
dissented. Id. at 2734-35 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2736-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Justices Powell and Stevens did not participate. See R. BERGER, supra note 107, at
323 (five-to-four split evidences deep disagreement about socially desirable result).
121. The Court may lose potency as an educative force if it relaxes or qualifies the
principle that color is irrelevant to hiring and admissions decisions. See Kaplan, supra
note 3, at 379 ("any legal classification by race weakens the government as an educative
force"); O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L.
REv. 925, 933-34 (1974) (same).
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hostility toward blacks.' 22 Such quotas also may reinforce stereotypes
of racial inferiority. 12 3 There is, moreover, an inherent unfairness in
forcing innocent persons to bear the burden of redressing grievances
not of their own making.12 4
On the other hand, notions of distributive' 25 as well as reparative 26
justice support demands for affirmative action. Aiding the education-
ally and economically disadvantaged is widely recognized as an im-
portant and legitimate social goal. 27 Race-conscious affirmative action
seems a sensible way to attain the goals of distributive justice: race is
a rough proxy for socioeconomic status since discrimination has dis-
advantaged some minority groups pervasively. 2 Affirmative action
also may benefit society more directly. 29 Giving minority individuals
preferences in education and employment may help stabilize minority
communities 30 and promote contact between the races.' 31
122. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298-99 (1978) (Powell, J., an-
nouncing judgment of the Court) (citing United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part)); see Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of
"Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 559, 571 (1975)(preferences will encourage racial politics); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Ed-
ucation: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Ci. L. REv. 653, 697 (1975)
(danger that racial preferences will exacerbate social tensions).
123. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (Powell, J., an-nouncing judgment of the Court) (preferential treatment reinforces beliefs that minorities
cannot achieve success without special aid); see Kaplan, supra note 3, at 378 (preferences
may damage blacks' self-image).
124. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (Powell, J., an-
nouncing judgment of the Court); Nisbet, Affirmative Action-A Liberal Program? in
REVERSE DISCRaMINATION 50 (B. Gross ed. 1977) (reverse discrimination unfair to individual
whites).
125. See Kaplan, suPra note 3, at 365 (distributive justice would put blacks on equal
economic footing with whites); Nickel, Remedial Uses of Race: A Moral Dilemma, 21
How. L.J. 513, 514 (1978) (racial preferences are way of dealing with inequalities of
income).
126. See B. BiTTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973) (blacks deserve repara-
tions for years of slavery and governmentally sanctioned discrimination); Collins, The
United States Owes Reparations to its Black Citizens, 16 How. L.J. 82 (1970).
127. See 14 WEEKLY COmP. OF PREs. Doc. 98, 103-07 (Jan. 19, 1978) (President Carter's
State of Union Address); Kaplan, supra note 3, at 365 (true equality achieved by treating
people according to need).
128. See Hughes, Reparations for Blacks? 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1063, 1072-73 (1968); Ex-
Panding Scope of 1981, supra note 16, at 444.
129. See Ginger, Who Needs Affirmative Action, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 265, 270-
77 (1979) (people of different backgrounds needed to solve complex problems of world
peace and domestic order).
130. See O'Neil, The Case for Preferential Admissions, in REVERSE DISCIMINATION,
supra note 124, at 68-69 (statistics on minority representation in professions); Sandalow,
supra note 122, at 689 (increased number of minority professionals should encourage
aspirations of minority children). But see DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 342 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (purpose of university cannot be to produce black lawyers for
blacks).
131. Erie Human Relations Comm'n v. Tullio, 360 F. Supp. 628, 630 (W.D. Pa. 1973)
(racial quotas promote integration); see Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal
Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955, 974 (1974) (main purpose of affirmative action is "to bring
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The legal and social debate over affirmative action has failed to yield
broad consensus or dominant values. In deciding whether Congress
may proscribe private affirmative action as an incident of slavery,
therefore, neither public norms nor practical considerations furnish a
clear guide. Accordingly, the framers' intent must govern interpreta-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment. 132
The foregoing legislative history shows that the framers intended
to do no more than protect those whites who were penalized for aiding
blacks. This narrow view of the framers' understanding of the Thir-
teenth Amendment contrasts sharply with the view implicit in the
McDonald Court's version of the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Act of 186 6.133 The McDonald Court's showing that the Thirty-Ninth
Congress felt authorized to protect whites and blacks equally, however,
misconstrued the legislative history of section 1981. What little dis-
cussion there was in the Thirty-Ninth Congress of protecting whites
again concerned only whites persecuted on account of their abolitionist
beliefs, not their color.'
34
the races face to face"); Sandalow, supra note 122, at 686 (need to increase communication
across racial lines). Greater interracial contact may help dispel misconceptions and
stereotypes of racial inferiority. See Greenawalt, supra note 122, at 592-94; Expanding
Scope of 1981, supra note 16, at 444.
132. Cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CI. L.
R y. 723, 728 (1974) (Fourteenth Amendment should not be applied, without sense of its
historical function, to prohibit benign discrimination).
133. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1976) (Thirty-
Ninth Congress believed Thirteenth Amendment authorized protection of whites gen-
erally). Even though many proponents of the 1866 Act had no hand in passing the
Thirteenth Amendment, see note 20 supra, their conception of congressional authority
to protect whites under the amendment is arguably relevant in discerning the original
understanding because the Act was passed pursuant to authority granted Congress by the
amendment. Cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926) (examining enactments of
early Congresses to discern original understanding of Constitution).
134. The Court conceded that a mechanical reading of the statute, assuring all persons
the same right to contract "as is enjoyed by white citizens," would lead to the conclusion
that whites are not protected. The legislative history of § 1981 was reviewed, however, to
show that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" was intended merely to emphasize
"'the racial character of the rights being protected.'" 427 U.S. at 287 (quoting Georgia
v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966)).
Several members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were quoted as saying that the statute
would guarantee the same civil rights to people of all races. Id. at 287-96. The McDonald
Court admitted, however, that these "remarks might be read consistently either with the
position that the measure was solely for relief of nonwhites, or with the position that it
applies to protect whites as well." Id. at 289 n.20. The former reading is recommended
by the Court's further concession that "the immediate impetus for the bill was the
necessity for further relief of the constitutionally emancipated former Negro slaves. .. ."
id. at 289; see p. 408 supra (Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted to thwart Black Codes).
The Court pointed to only one proponent who explicitly stated that the statute would
protect whites-Senator Trumbull of Illinois. Id. at 290. Trumbull's remarks were provoked
by charges by Senator Davis and others that the bill provided extraordinary federal pro-
Thirteenth Amendment
Precise historical analysis thus indicates that discrimination against
whites, when motivated by a hostility towards blacks, is a proper object
of congressional attack under the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth
Amendment. Pre-McDonald cases conform to this understanding. For
instance, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,135 the Supreme
Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 affords whites relief when
they have been "punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minori-
ties.' 136 The white plaintiff in that case was permitted to challenge his
expulsion from a privately operated, racially restricted park for trying
to have a black admitted. 37
The rationale of Sullivan also has been applied to employment con-
troversies. Thus, a white employee has standing to sue his employer
under section 1981 if discharged in retaliation for efforts to end dis-
crimination against nonwhite coworkers. 38 Courts have recognized
that denying white employees standing to sue in this situation would
encourage discriminatory conduct to continue. 39
The Sullivan Court's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
tection for blacks only. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Davis); C. FAIRMAN, supra note 20, at 1176, 1194 (remarks of Sen. Saulsbury and President
Johnson). Yet Trumbull's rejoinder accords with the narrow view, repeatedly expressed
during debate on the Thirteenth Amendment, that the amendment and Reconstruction
legislation would benefit not only blacks, but also whites who had been persecuted on
account of their abolitionist views. See Shoenberger, supra note 27, at 91-94 (Act was in-
tended to protect whites in South).
135. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
136. Id. at 237. In Sullivan, the Court held that a nonstock corporation organized to
operate a community park for residents of a designated area violated § 1982 by expelling
a white member for trying to have a black admitted. Subsequently, in Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973), the Court, faced with a similar
factual situation, decided that white plaintiffs could also look to § 1981 for relief. Id. at
439-40; ef. Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1979) (corpora-
tion has standing to sue under § 1981 for damages arising from interference with its
contracts with nonwhites).
137. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 234-35 (1969). Although
privately operated, the park was not a private social club. It was open to every white
citizen within the area, "there being no selective element other than race." Id. at 236.
138. See, e.g., Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing
Sullivan); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), modified, 520 F.2d 409
(1975) (white plaintiff allegedly forced into retirement because he sold his home, located
in neighborhood of Kodak employees, to blacks); Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp.
663 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (employer violates § 1981 if he intentionally causes damage to whites
to advance policy of racial discrimination against blacks).
139. See, e.g., Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266, 1270 (6th Cir. 1977) (applying
Sullivan rationale); National Organization for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 457 F. Supp.
1338, 1346 (D. Conn. 1978). In SPerry Rand, the court permitted a white to sue under
§ 1981 on the theory that if the employer's practice of discriminatory hiring and firing
were entirely successful, there would never be a black with sufficient interest to com-
plain. Id. at 1347.
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comports with the legislative history of the Thirteenth Amendment.1
40
Discrimination against whites prompted by racial animus towards
blacks, such as appeared in Sullivan, was considered an incident of
slavery by the drafters. However, the implication of McDonald, that
Congress could properly exercise its Thirteenth Amendment power to
ban racial discrimination against whites in favor of blacks pursuant
to bona fide affirmative action plans, draws no support from the
legislative history.14' Only the limited reading of section 1981, ac-
cepted by courts before McDonald, properly confines the authority
granted Congress by the Thirteenth Amendment.
140. The white plaintiff was punished not on account of his race, but because of his
"advocacy" of a black man's cause-precisely the type of discrimination against whites
decried by the framers. See pp. 408-12 suPra.
141. The view that the Thirteenth Amendment does not protect whites generally was
consistently maintained in cases arising immediately after ratification. For instance, Jus-
tice Swayne wrote that the amendment's sole aim was to remove from the states the
power to fix the status of blacks. United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 794 (C.C.D. Ky.
1866) (No. 16,151) ("The whites needed no relief or protection, and they are practically
unaffected by the amendment.") (dictum). Subsequently, the Supreme Court invalidated a
federal statute on the ground that it protected whites as well as blacks. United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883). Congress, in 1871, had enacted a statute intended to combat
the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court reasoned that the statute was broader
than the Thirteenth Amendment authorized because it literally applied to a conspiracy
of two blacks against a white or a conspiracy of two whites against a third white. Id. at
641.
